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 Abstract 
This descriptive study seeks to identify the level of influence that authoritarian 
regimes have on development with countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). The question behind this study is important in that not much is known about 
the autocratic countries within these regions though many of these countries have 
experienced much economic success in spite of difference in authoritarian regimes, and 
the threat of the resource curse. The data I have gathered focuses on observing variables 
 such as GDP per capita (PPP), GDP annual growth, life expectancy index as well as the 
human development index which are observed within the autocracies present within the 
MENA. These variables are then tested to find correlations linking a country’s 
performance to the type of authoritarian regime it possesses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter One: Introduction  
Numerous studies such as those by Almas Heshmati and Nam-Seok Kim, Carlos 
Pereira and Vladimir Teles along with many others have linked democracy to greater 
economic development (Heshmati & Kim 2017, Pereira & Teles 2016). Though these 
studies may predict that because of this many countries may consider democratization, 
the reality is that over 40% of the population is ruled by authoritarian regimes with a high 
proportion of these being in the Middle East and North Africa (Freedom House 2014). 
These countries, though they differ in regime types from other nations, perform quite 
well economically. For example, countries in Middle East such as the United Arab 
Emirates and Qatar have surpassed the United States GDP per capita of $59,500. The 
United Arab Emirates GDP is over $67,700 and Qatar's GDP per capita at $124,500, 
more than twice the GDP of the United States (CIA Factbook, 2018).  
While these statistics show that countries under authoritarian rule can thrive 
economically, it is also important to note that some of these countries are oil-producing 
nations, and as a result have accumulated much wealth from this resource. However what 
should also be considered is that there are also countries that surround those previously 
mentioned that do not experience the same economic success even if they were to possess 
oil or experience the same regime type. What I am seeking to observe 
 within my research is whether there are authoritarian regimes that are better suited than 
others on account of not only their resources but also their structure. 
The countries that I am observing are autocracies in the MENA region that have 
experienced high and low factors of economic and social development, at times on 
account of being more or less authoritarian. The regime types of these nations are 
recognized as military dictatorships, single-party dictatorships, and theocracies. And 
because each type presents a different level of authoritarianism, I would need to compare 
the different factors that comprise each type of autocracy and observe whether these 
 attributes affect the factors of one's economic and social development. 
This leads me to my research question:  Does the nature of different authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East and North-African (MENA) shape the extent of  their 
economic development? My question involves observing the leadership of autocratic 
regimes and whether some autocracies in comparison to some others have a more 
promising effect on the economy within Middle Eastern/North African countries.  
With  ⅓ of the world's population residing in these regimes, there is a reason as to why 
leaders of countries choose this approach over others regardless of the risks, downfalls, 
and the resource curse that pursuing this regime type poses (Freedom House 2014).  
The research I will perform in response to this question will be significant in that it is 
essential to understand how authoritarian regimes within these regions achieve and 
manage their economical means. Their policies not only affect the ⅓ of the population 
that live there, but also the ⅔ of the population that may reside in countries in where trade 
is conducted, international peace relations have taken place, resources are/could be 
shared, and much more.  
 
Chapter Two:Literature Background 
2.1 Maintaining Power 
When a leader comes into power, his main goal is to maintain his power. To do 
this, he needs a winning coalition. Not only is the winning coalition important for 
obtaining power initially, but also maintaining power. Bueno de Mesquita, et al. states in 
their book ​The Logic of Political Survival​ that a winning coalition is essential for a leader 
to maintain a position of power and if a leader wishes to ensure this, then he must deliver 
private payouts to the each of the members. However, this is ideal for an authoritarian 
regime where the winning coalition is not as big. If the winning coalition tends to contain 
too many members to deliver payouts, the leader then focuses on obtaining public goods, 
though this mostly occurs in democracies. In relation to this, the book addresses that it is 
important to keep the winning coalition small because the more members you have of 
your winning coalition, the more costs you have to bear. Moreover, political leaders 
desire to maximize their control over policy choices through their position, but acquiring 
power can be costly, therefore a leader must minimize costs by having the smallest 
winning coalition necessary (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith & Siverson 2003). 
This leads me to key elements to consider that might differ depending on regime. 
For example, consider the number of  leaders in power, meaning whether there is only 
one person or a group leading. Another thing is that there are different authoritarian 
regimes that allow more than one individual to be serve in leadership such as single-party 
dictatorships or military juntas, and because there are more interests to be considered due 
to more people in power, there might potentially be more costs involved as well.  
2.2 Obtaining Power  
While the main goal of a leader is to maintain his power, he may face trouble in 
doing so whether that is because of not maintaining the satisfaction of his winning 
coalition or adopting policies that hurt the economy. These policies can be rent-seeking in 
which the leader use to pay his winning coalition, however if the economy has been 
dramatically affected by a leader's policies, he may be unable to pay his winning 
coalition.  
As a result of not performing well in these areas, a leader’s power might be 
threatened by the presence of a potential challenger (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith 
& Siverson 2003). Bueno de Mesquita, et al. states that for some leaders, the challenger is 
not much of a threat because becoming a challenger poses its difficulties as well. They 
recognize these challenges as  part of Challenger’s Dilemma because a challenger needs 
to win over members of the current leader’s coalition, however the challenger faces 
problems with producing credibility (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith & Siverson 
2003). Members of the current leader’s winning coalition are currently receiving payouts 
and if the leader stays in office, they are guaranteed to keep receiving these benefits so 
long as they are a member of his winning coalition. In addition to this, because there is no 
guarantee that challenger would win, many individuals of a winning coalition are less 
likely to defect. This is on account of the fact that becoming a part of the challenger’s 
coalition would be too much of a risk (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith & Siverson 
2003).  This is important in that if we are observing the structure of authoritarian regimes 
and how it affects economic development then we need to know about threats that can 
affect the regime such as the Challenger´s Dilemma which can influence the economy 
due to transitions of power.  
Something to consider with the Challenger´s Dilemma is that a political group can 
not only take on the role of leadership, but also that of a challenger as well.  In ​The Logic 
of Political Survival​,  the Challenger’s Dilemma is portrayed as an image of one 
individual trying to win the likes of many, but as previously aforementioned, individuals 
can rule as one political body, and if there is more than one challenger to the current 
leader (meaning if there are many individuals serving as the challenger but in the form of 
one political group), then there are more individuals to be considered within this concept. 
Secondly, one must consider that the political group as a challenger might be able to 
convince members to defect simply by its accompaniments. For example, a military 
regime is comprised of militia and while the nature of this regime might not be able to get 
individuals to defect because of its lack credibility, perhaps they can do so with their use 
of force. To note, some members are going to want to defect regardless of the risk of not 
being in the winning coalition. Everyone who may be currently in the winning coalition 
might not agree with the agenda or policies of the current leader, and because they do not 
agree, they might defect to a challenger in which they do support or any challenger so 
long as they are not under current leader anymore. This of course would be of their own 
volition and not because the challenger was proven credible. Some members are quite 
passionate about seeing their government under the right leadership. And although this 
rarely occurs due to costs, some are more willing to risk everything to allow change to 
occur, even if it means being disloyal to their current leader. This consequently affects 
economic development in that leaders help shape the economic policies, however if there 
is threat in leadership then there is a possibility that a regime´s economic policies could 
experience change with new leadership. This could later be expressed through the data.  
2.3 Economic Development and Institutions  
Vollmer defines development as ¨a whole depends on each individual's 
capabilities” (Vollmer 2009).  And he also states that capabilities define the freedom to 
choose a valuable life in accordance with individual preferences¨ (Vollmer 2009). This is 
to say that  economic development could mean that an individual has the capability to 
choose a valuable life in accordance to one's preferences as a product of one´s economy 
(Vollmer 2009). Vollmer´s research  relates economic development with an institution´s 
ability to contribute to human development, and addresses how democracies are ideal for 
providing things that contribute to human development such as education, healthcare, 
welfare provisions, etc. on account of the demands of their constitutions (Vollmer 2009). 
Democracies have a constitutional responsibility to redistribute their wealth in order to 
fulfill these roles and this might disadvantage them when their economies are not 
performing as well (Vollmer 2009). He also references the Lee Hypothesis which states 
that authoritarian regimes are more adept to target failures within the economy as well as 
creating growth on account of their economic policies because they do not hold any 
responsibility to their constituents (Vollmer 2009). This can be vital because at times 
countries might need flexibility to exercise actions within their policies as a way of 
attacking issues faced within their economy. 
 While it is true that providing these things as a form of public goods can serve as 
investment in the citizens which can generate growth within the economy because 
citizens feel more inclined to work for a government that works for them, it also true that 
these provisions are costly. At times, it may not be possible to supply these things or a 
country might need to stop the provision for a time being to rectify issues within its 
economy. A regime cannot do that if they are binded by a constitution 
 to take care of the welfare of the people.  
After reading Vollmer, while some countries within my study might hold some 
validity to the Lee Hypothesis because they are performing well due to the nature of their 
regime, there are some countries of my study that are not performing well. This brings up 
the observation that just because the nature of the regime may allow it to be efficient in 
combating the economic issues, does not mean the systems of the countries within this 
regime are efficient in themselves to take on this role. In addition to this, some of the 
countries within my study are providing things that democracies are only expected to be 
efficient in supplying as well as improving conditions to better their economy. As a 
result, the progress of these countries should be monitored in human development as well 
as in economic development. This may serve as a counterargument to Vollmer and as an 
implication for countries such as these in the future.  
From the previous article, Vollmer illustrates what economic development can be 
recognized as, and Dobler builds on that concept by implying that the one can observe the 
strength of a regime based on the developments a country has exhibited as a result of its 
economy. From ​The Logic of Political Survival​, we learn that leaders desire to stay in 
power and they look for ways to preserve it.  Challengers may not only arise on account 
of dissatisfaction with misguidance on certain political issues, but also lack of private 
goods and dissatisfaction with the use of resources, labor, and capital of a country.  These 
things have a great influence on how a country might perform within and on account of 
its economy.  
Dobler discusses that some countries within the MENA region may vary within 
their economic performances (Dobler 2011). By referencing the World Bank's 
classification of these countries into three groups: (RPLA; resource-poor, labor abundant 
economies, RRLA; resource-rich, labor-abundant economies, and RRLI; resource-rich, 
labor importing countries), Dobler is able to illustrate how some countries of the MENA 
region may be more adept or more disadvantaged with their economy because they are in 
lacking or abundance of natural or easily extractable resources (Dobler 2011).  Thus, this 
affects how they are able to develop their country because of more or less money being 
circulated within their economy. 
Dobler also addresses how after the Great Depression of the 1930s, a 
development model was enforced in the MENA countries which involved observing a 
country's ability to provide things such as education, housing, healthcare, food subsidies, 
physical capital accumulations, social security and public investments, etc., as a way of 
monitoring a country's economic performance based on its ability to develop these things 
(Dobler 2011). In addition to this, birth rate, death rate, school enrollment rate 
 and productivity rate were also observed because a country's economy depends on the 
individuals being healthy, skilled, and productive in order to run as efficiently as possible 
(Dobler 2011).  
This information on economic development can be useful within my assessment 
of defining variables of economic development such as education, welfare provisions, 
housing, productivity rates, etc. However, what Dobler´s literature does not address is 
that when studying authoritarian regimes, some of these countries often do not provide 
things such as these because they can be regarded as public goods, and public goods are 
costly and at times unattainable. In addition to this, providing these things to individuals 
may require management which may result in a leader becoming less sovereign because 
of their inability to oversee all functions of their government. Although some of the 
countries within my study have delegated powers to another individual such as a prime 
minister, it is essential to consider that not all of them have done this because the way 
their regime is structured can affect results of their economic development. 
In the previous literature, Dobler implicitly mentions that some countries might be 
better off than others such as a country who is RRLA (resource rich, labor abundant), for 
example Iran (Dobler 2011). As a result of having resources and being abundance in 
labor, Dobler assumes that a country might be able to increase things such as productivity 
rate which would serve as a factor of economic development (Dobler 2011). However, in 
“ Economic Development and Vulnerabilities”, the authors assert that although Iran has 
shown an abundance in oil reserves, many Iranians themselves do not think that they will 
be able to keep up the production rate because they do not have the technologies or the 
capital to create recovery programs to sustain production (Crane et al. 2008).  
Now, oil is a main export of many of the countries involved within my study, and 
a lot of these countries generate their wealth on account of this main export. This scenario 
exhibits that when there are problems within the main export, it leads to problems within 
the wealth of the country (Crane et al. 2008). And if there are problems with the wealth, 
there will be problems in generating anything in regard to education, health, public 
investment, and much more because wealth is needed to produce these things. For this 
reason, economic policies of a country should be considered when evaluating economic 
development (Crane et al. 2008). Being that with having a main export it can generate 
wealth,  though complications may arise. Therefore, a country might strive to be more 
efficient in its policies to accommodate. This could mean developing policies concerning 
the elimination of privatization, FDI, trade, regulatory policies, increasing exchange 
rates, etc.  
With this prospective, it is important realize that although countries have 
discrepancies within their economies such as not being able to maintain productivity 
rates, lack of resources, lack of capital, etc., many of these countries are not willing to 
collaborate with other countries within the MENA region to meet their needs (Crane et al. 
2008). This could be on account of the security dilemma, concerns with maintaining their 
sovereignty, and at times maintaining absolute gains of resources, capital, as well as 
many other things. Although there are some countries who recognize that maintaining all 
of their sovereignty and obtaining absolute gains may not be the best scenario for their 
countries such as members of the GCC (Gulf Countries Council), there are many who do 
and as a result their economic policies involving trade, exchange rate, FDI, etc. are 
considered to be more protectionist. This can also lead to a deficiency in economic 
development within these countries in this region on account of more competition for 
jobs, resources, and labor which can actually lead to a decrease in things production rate 
(issues with supply and demand), welfare provisions, birth/death rates, and much more. 
Not only could it decrease these things previously aforementioned, but it could also 
provide an increase in unemployment rates, inflation rates, income distribution, poverty 
level, and national debt as well as other things that negatively affect the economic 
development of a country. Lastly to add, these negatives effects can attract challenges to 
a leader's power such as opposition from challenger and even threats of a regime 
breakdown. 
As previously mentioned, the MENA region has an uneven distribution of wealth 
and resources. While some countries are rich and looking to expand, others are on their 
last leg. Luciani states in his book ​Combining Economic Development in MENA​ that to 
rectify problems such as this we must stabilize the political systems, however to stabilize 
the political systems, it would require a regional effort from all countries within the 
MENA region to move towards economic integration (Luciani 2017). Integrating 
 the economies would require liberating economic policies, establishing trade relations, 
exchanging resources, sharing wealth, etc. Allowing for these policies to take place 
would allow for resources and wealth to be more evenly distributed which can only seek 
to improve efficiency of production. This can allow for countries to remedy their political 
system, i.e., reevaluate their redistribution policies to where they can now provide things 
for their citizens such as welfare provisions, healthcare, education, and so much more. 
Hence, it serves as economic investments that contribute to more development (Luciani 
2017).  These provisions can lead to workers being healthier and more skilled which can 
lead to efficiency, and an increase production rates which can better one´s economy. This 
is not to say that one can expect a democratic peace between authoritarian regimes, but 
that there can be efforts made that can make conditions be a bit better than they are 
currently. 
One of the drawbacks to Luciani´s research which he also addresses is that some 
countries are more permissive of this than others. Some countries are in the position to try 
policies such as these out because they can afford to be in a position where they can 
sustain their economies if it does not work out as planned (Luciani 2017). Not all 
countries within this region are as politically permissive as others are. Consider the 
situation where a country only has a limited amount of resources, but 
 economic integration policies require it to share its resources or to pay taxes on 
imports/exports when the country does not have much money to begin with. That country 
has everything to lose. As a result, the country might be more protectionist. Although the 
demand for resources and wealth continues to grow and becomes more desperate every 
day for countries within this region, some countries may never be comfortable taking that 
risk, so that reasoning must kept in mind because the way these countries redistribute 
wealth and resources, regard power, manage imports and exports etc., are going to be in 
accordance to its logic. 
2.4 Factors that Influence Regime Survival 
In considering the economic growth of autocratic countries in the MENA region, 
we should recognize that many of these countries are oil-producing countries, and they 
generate wealth on account of that. And according to research by Geddes, Wright, and 
Frantz in​ Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival​, if an autocratic oil-producing country 
experiences great wealth then not only is the leader able to buy support and repress 
domestic unrest, but also able to suppress opposition from challengers that could 
 potentially lead to his ousting (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz 2013). More specifically with 
the income coming in from the oil, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz state that the leader can 
utilize some of the wealth to purchase a better military for enforcement of policies 
making it to where there would less likely be chance for revolt or competition against the 
government due to the risk of punishment (Geddes,Wright, & Frantz 2013).  These 
policies can be beneficial and detrimental to a country's economic performance in that 
tools needed can be costly which is less wealth contributed to one´s economy though 
these influences can result in the compliance of citizens. However, the authors assert that 
for countries to be able to do this, they need to be rent-seeking countries meaning that the 
wealth is not distributed directly to the creation of more wealth, therefore leaders are able 
to manipulate the distribution of the wealth. This can help autocratic oil-producing 
countries to prolong the survival of their regime because they are able to prevent potential 
threats to a leader’s power from occurring. 
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s research is limited in that it only applies autocratic 
rent-seeking countries. However there are many countries that are autocratic within the 
MENA region that cannot be rent-seeking because the type of authoritarian regime they 
have holds them constitutionally responsible for their distribution of wealth such as the 
constitutional monarchies in Bahrain and Jordan. These autocratic countries can be quite 
wealthy, for example the United Arab Emirates. But because government types that 
exercise quasi-democratic institutions might impose limitations that require them to share 
the distribution wealth throughout their country, they may not be able to manipulate the 
distribution of wealth to ensure the longevity of their regime.  
In addition to this, due to quite a few authoritarian regimes delegating power to 
councils or prime ministers as well as allowing things such as elections to take place, 
many are wondering if the MENA region is seeking to democratize itself. Ehteshami 
references ​Norton´s Civil Society in the Middle East​ to state that although there are some 
countries that are seeking to liberalize their economies, impose limitations on their 
power, and perhaps join institutions, it does not mean that they are wholeheartedly 
 ready to change their entire political systems (Ehteshami 1999). He uses the term 
quasi-democratic meaning of a partial democracy to describe their behavior . Ehteshami 
makes that argument that although some of these countries are giving the impression that 
they are delegating some freedoms to the public such as the ability to the participate in 
free elections, these leaders of these political systems still hold full control over these 
political practices (Ehteshami 1999). 
While these tactics might be part of a political ruse to give the impression of the 
government's interest in the well-being of a citizen to create economic development, this 
can lead to actual systemic transformation, for example “redirection in politics, economy, 
and even policy which can be a positive effect on the political systems and the 
economy”(Ehteshami 1999). Last, but not least, though there might be efforts to establish 
quasi-democracies with the MENA region for bettering economic conditions, there are 
also efforts from other countries within the MENA region to stop the progression of the 
democratization (Ehteshami 1999). 
The author states that there are some autocratic countries who want to maintain an 
authoritarian regime and things such as liberalizing economies, pushing for trade 
relations, joining institutions, sharing resources etc. might impose on the direction leaders 
might want to point their country in.Moreover, Ehteshami mentions that some autocratic 
countries with the MENA region might actually want other countries to start the process 
of democratization so that they can have the opportunity to take over the regime once it 
breaks down because of premature actions (Ehteshami 1999). This might be due to the 
fact that democratization has not been proven very easy to implement within authoritarian 
regimes, mostly because democracies take time, resources, and implementation of 
policies that authoritarian regimes have not exercised prior. To go into the process 
without proper assessment could not only jeopardize a country's economy, but also a the 
survival of the country's regime.  
Ehteshami also asserts that while some countries might be only using policies of 
democracy as part of a sham to improve economies, there are many forces that are trying 
to keep the MENA region as authoritarian as possible (Ehteshami 1999). What his 
research fails to mention is whether or not the countries that are democratizing and 
pushing for liberalization are important influential countries within the MENA region 
such as the UAE, Qatar, Oman, etc. These countries are members of OPEC and they have 
 access to many resources and much wealth. The MENA region in itself does not have an 
even distribution of these things throughout its region, therefore it is important to take 
note that if these influential countries are pushing for other countries to implement these 
policies because lesser known countries within the MENA region whose economies are 
suffering might not be able to avoid their advances. One must also take note of whether 
the countries who are advocating for the entire region to remain authoritarian are any of 
the influential members. If these countries are not any of the influential countries such as 
thriving members of OPEC that other countries might have to defer to in order to keep 
their economies going, then their actions might not have as great of an impact as 
anticipated. Last, but not least, by creating the illusion of implementing certain 
quasi-democratic policies, it has led to certain developments in a country’s politics, but 
one must consider that a country might have been moving in that direction all along and 
that the implementation of certain policies might have simply been a happenstance 
instead of a byproduct of policy change.  
2.5 Regime Breakdowns and Transitions 
Due to poor economic choices, opposition in leadership, and competition from 
challengers, sometimes regime transitions/breakdowns are inevitable. And because 
leaders are aware of this, they try to manipulate their situation before it occurs. Within 
her article ​Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set​, Geddes 
states when leaders are facing a regime breakdown or transition, they might frame their 
policies a certain way to help better their potential post-ouster fate while in office 
(Geddes 2014). The whole goal as an authoritarian leader is not only to maintain political 
survival, but also make a plan of their own survival because with transition or regime 
breakdown, chances are that one could face imprisonment, exile, or even death depending 
on the preference of your challenger (Geddes 2014). Geddes asserts that even though 
many autocracies have the capacity to fail, military dictatorships have proven to have 
highest of failure rates, while monarchies have the lowest (Geddes 2014). This could be 
due to military dictatorships´ preference to hold onto as much power as they possibly can 
(relative gains) which makes them more likely to negotiate. Their ability to negotiate can 
allow for their exits and their approaches to be less violent which would make it easier to 
democratize or experience a regime breakdown (Geddes 2014). However with 
monarchies, they are the least likely to experience regime transition or breakdowns 
because they do not depend on election or coalition to institute their leaders.  
This is essential in that if countries are not performing well in these areas to 
where the regime breakdowns or transitions, one´s economy and/or economic 
development can either benefit or suffer. With new leaders, there is a possibility that the 
leadership could result in a different regime for the country as well as different political 
and economic policies (redistributive or non-distributive policies of wealth). 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: Hypotheses 
In ​Is The Middle East Democratizing​, Ehteshami discusses how some regimes 
within the MENA region have started exercising quasi-democratic institutions. These 
institutions in themselves are mere imitations of democratic structures that exercise 
policies expected to help improve economic conditions on account of their nature.These 
policies can be as simple as allowing the public the opportunity to participate in free 
elections and as complex as delegating power to others officials such as a prime minister 
 or a council to exercise a constraint on a leader's power. Implementing these policies can 
help with development in that they allow citizens to be more involved with the shaping of 
their government or at least create this illusion because citizens are more willing to be 
compliant in a government where they feel they are being represented. However because 
the policies are only quasi-democratic, meaning they only exercise partly as a democracy, 
the leader still holds majority of the power and does not have the same limitations on his 
power as a democratic leader would have. This concept paired with the Lee Hypothesis 
mentioned within Vollmer´s ​Political Institutions and Human Development ​leads me to 
my first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #1: Autocratic regimes of countries within the MENA region that 
exercise quasi-democratic institutions experience greater economic growth and 
development.  
The Lee Hypothesis is a theory that states authoritarian regimes are more capable 
of targeting and rectifying issues of their economic system than democracies because 
they are not bounded by constraints. For example, the power of democratic leaders is 
limited on account of provisions within their constitutions holding them responsible for 
providing the needs of their citizens. In addition to that, a democratic leader´s position 
can be contingent upon satisfying these needs in order to preserve the longevity of his 
regime. These restraints along with many others might hinder a democratic leader from 
making critical decisions concerning their economy because an error in judgment might 
jeopardize one´s leadership.  
With that being stated, the very nature of autocratic regimes allows them to target 
the issues of their economy more efficiently which can lead to wealth within their 
economy. However, I think that this only generates wealth and not growth and 
development within the economy.  My reason is that many of these autocratic countries 
within the MENA region export oil and as a result, many of these countries have 
generated much wealth on account of this. And because they can exercise economic 
policies that do not compel them to provide these things known as public goods to 
citizens (which can be costly), these countries do not have to redistribute the wealth as 
democracies would have to do. This allows them to keep much of their wealth.  
To add, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz tell us that sometimes autocracies use their 
wealth to buy support or repress domestic unrest. However if the leader is not 
redistributing the wealth back into his country but rather spending it to preserve his 
regime with reinforcements and suppressing domestic unrest, then he is not allowing for 
much growth to occur within his economy. Though fixing market failures can be costly, 
leaders desire to create economic growth because money is essentially power and as 
 The Logic Political Survival ​states leaders´ main concerns are obtaining power, 
maintaining it, and maximizing it.  
 Also, if a leader was to exercise quasi-democratic institutions that advocated for 
quasi-democratic policies then that might serve as incentive for citizens which can lead to 
economic growth. Quasi-democratic policies as those previously mentioned can better 
factors of economic development and because development can serve as investment to 
better the economy, the economy will exhibit growth. This practice in addition to already 
being better equipped to target economic failures is why I anticipate autocratic regimes 
within the MENA region that exercise these institutions will experience growth in their 
economy and their development.  
Geddes states in her article ​Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transition: A New 
Data ​set that monarchies are the least likely to experience transition or breakdown on 
account of the power of their leader being inherent. This information leads me to my next 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #2: Absolute monarchies in the MENA region will have lower economic 
and social development.  
Although I am aware that I have some constitutional monarchies within my study, 
I anticipate that the absolute monarchies with the MENA region will not be as socially 
developed or experience as much as economic development as any of the other 
authoritarian regimes within the MENA region because of their disincentive to 
implement quasi-democratic policies.  
All the power within an absolute monarchy is entrusted in one individual, and this 
individual can look forward to ruling as long as he lives without much threat of a regime 
breakdown or transition because the role is inherent. Due to the lack of threats, 
breakdowns or transitions, the leader does not have an incentive to delegate any powers 
to other officials such as a prime minister and they can choose to not entrust any power in 
quasi-democratic institutions such as a council either. All decisions concerning their 
country's government and economy can flow solely from the leader, an absolute monarch 
can choose to allow this to remain that way.  
Without quasi-democratic institutions there is less advocating for 
quasi-democratic policies which can mean less economic development and more 
importantly, less economic growth.  In ​Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival​, the authors 
mention that is more beneficial for authoritarian regimes to be rent-seeking because they 
will not have to redistribute the wealth throughout their economy if they are exercising 
this activity. In addition, they also state by not redistributing the wealth back into a 
country's economy they can choose to invest in things that can preserve their longevity. 
However, if an authoritarian regime is already of one that does not experience much 
turnover or breakdown because of lack of competition or opposition in the government 
due to inherent roles, then what incentive does he have to invest in these things at all? 
From ​The Logic of Political Survival​, we learn that once a leader becomes in power, his 
goal is to maintain his power and maximize it. An absolute monarch has the capability to 
do just that- stay in power and maximize his power by obtaining all the wealth because 
money can equal power as well. It is for these reasons that I hypothesize that absolute 
monarchies in the MENA region will have poor performances regarding social and 
economic development. 
I would like also like to apply this same concept with my third hypothesis, but in 
reverse. This leads me to my third hypothesis.  
Hypothesis #3. Authoritarian countries in the MENA region who are resource and 
labor abundant will be the most developed. 
Because these countries not only have the resources, but also the labor to be 
economically successful, I anticipate that these countries would be more capable of 
focusing their efforts on bettering economic development. This development could be 
represented as countries delegating powers to other officials, allowing for free elections 
to occur, providing for the general welfare, and as well as other things. As previously 
mentioned, this can lead to growth within the economy so I anticipate countries 
 of this nature to also be more prone in exercising quasi-democratic policies that allow for 
growth. My reason being is that because these nations are resource-rich and labor 
abundant with a liberalized economy, they have all the tools needed for economic 
development. And because they have the tools to be economically efficient than those 
countries within the MENA region that are lacking these things, they may also be in a 
better position to improve their social development due to already being in possession of 
the tools needed to do so.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Regime, Power, and Level of Authoritarianism Charts  
 
4.1 Regime Chart and Explanation 
In Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz´s article ​Autocratic 
Breakdown and Regime Transition: A New Data Se​t, they developed categories (e.g. 
party, military, etc) in which a country can be classified on account of the qualities 
exhibited within the regime. However because my sample study observes development 
over a given time period where transitions can occur, I have performed research to 
categorize the time periods of each subunit within my study based on the GWF 
codebook. I have also provided my reasoning for why the authors or I can place them into 
that category. This serves to identify the types of authoritarian regimes that are presented 
within my sample. 
Figure 1. ​Regime Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. ​Regime Chart ​(Continued)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Algeria  
Within the GWF codebook, Algeria is coded as a party-military from years 
1963-1992 and as military from 1993 to present-day. GWF defines a party to be a state 
where leaderships, security, and policy is placed in the hands of a ruling party. In addition 
to this, the state possesses a large selectorate and small winning coalition, meaning that 
more people were needed to choose the leader, but less people were involved in helping 
the incumbent stay in power. As for a military, the codebook actually defines military as 
an institutionalized military rule that involves consultations within the officer corps and 
implies constraint by other officers on the dictator, which differs from the definition use 
to classify a regime as military within the CGV (Cheibub, Ghandi, and Vreeland) 
codebook, where a military is defined as autocracies led by men who have ever been 
officers. Last, but not least, the codebook regards a military as dictators who govern in 
collaboration with other officers.  
 The reason why this time period is classified as a party-military within the GWF 
codebook is that from 1963-1992 , the Boumédiènne Regime ruled as a unified political 
body that was predominantly composed of military leaders, but also non-military member 
that had leadership positions and who were also in power. The political body that the 
members made up known as the Council of Revolution created a large selectorate being 
that the body was composed of 26 members. And because they had such a large 
 selectorate, the winning coalition was kept small.The military and non-military leaders 
served as one under the constitution in 1963 which placed constraints on themselves in 
ruling individually.  
Algeria is regarded as military in 1993 up to present-day because after the 
Boumédiènne Regime, the Algerian Civil War took place and many coup d'etats occurred 
and militias emerged leaving the country under military rule for some time.  
4.1.2 Bahrain  
Bahrain is coded as a monarchy from the year 1971- present which the codebook 
defines as a political institution where a royal family rules and possesses a small 
selectorate and a small winning coalition. The royal family that has been in power since 
1971 is the Al Khalifa Dynasty and because it is a monarchy, the leadership position is 
passed down through royal lineage which cuts down the selectorate. In addition, because 
the family in power will remain in power unless the power is abdicated, there is no need 
for a large winning coalition. It is important to keep in mind that although Bahrain is a 
constitutional monarchy, it is to be considered as an authoritarian monarchy.  
4.1.3 Egypt 
From 1923-1952, Egypt was ruled by the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, and because it 
ruled as a royal family, Egypt during this time period is coded as a monarchy.  In 1953, 
Egypt suffered a coup d´état that was led by Gamal Abdel Nasser who later became the 
leader of Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser was also a leader with the Baath Socialist Party and 
implemented their policies while in office. Although Gamal Abdel Nasser was in power, 
the Muhammad Ali Dynasty was still continued with Fuad II.  As a result, Egypt is coded 
as party-personal-monarchy.  
4.1.4 Iran 
Iran is coded as a monarchy from 1926 until 1979 due to the presence of a royal 
family (Pahlavi Dynasty) being in power at that time. The power of this ruling family was 
inherited which concerned less people being involved in electing the leader. On account 
of the inheritance of power, the successor did not not need a large winning coalition due 
to his leadership being guaranteed. This regime ended in 1979 after the Iranian 
Revolution which led to instituting Ayatollah Khamenei as leader, shifting the regime 
from monarchy to theocracy. I categorized the regime of theocracy as a personal regime 
because the qualities that a theocracy possesses best correlates with what the codebook 
constitutes as a personal regime. The codebook defines a personal regime as a rule where 
dictators are not constrained by a strong party or a unified party and that is centered 
around one individual that holds power.  Currently, Iran's regime is led by an individual 
who professes to rule in accordance to Islamic principles and values, however he is not 
constrained to a party and the government is centered around him who holds power. This 
regime still holds today.  
4.1.5 Iraq 
Iraq is coded as a monarchy from the years of 1933-1958 under the GWF 
codebook because its government was ruled by the Hashemite Dynasty during this time 
period. This was until the Hashemite Dynasty was overthrown and former President 
Muhammad Najib ar-Ruba´i came into power. The GWF codebook codes this reign as 
personal because the dictator was unconstrained by a party and the politics were centered 
around one individual who held power. In 1963, a coup d'etat was held and overthrew the 
presidency of Muhammad Najib ar-Ruba´i  leaving Abdul Salam Arif in charge. His rule 
was also conditioned to be personal because he also did not belong to a party, and all the 
power of the government rested in his hands. He served until his death in 1966 in which 
his brother (Abdul Rahman Arif)  took his place as president. This rule was also 
classified as a personal regime.  
From 1969-1979, Iraq is classified as party-personal regime. After the 
government ousted the Abdul Rahman Arif as president, the prime minister Ahmed 
Hassan al Bakr and the Baáth Party took over the Iraqi government. Majority of the 
power was concentrated in the hands of Ahmed Hassan al Bakr and although he had the 
influence of the Baath Party, he was not constrained by them. The Baath Party also 
contributes to Iraq´s status of being personal-party because they not only had a hand in 
placing Ahmed Hassan al Bakr in power, but they themselves had retained power and had 
control over certain policies set in place.  
That is until in 1980 when Saddam Hussein took the presidency as a result of 
domestic rest. He ruled until 2003, and the GWF codebook his reign as personal because 
he although he was influenced by the Baath Party, he was not constrained by the party, 
and the ruling power was centered and placed in the hands of one individual. His reign 
would later affect my classification of Iraq as two separate countries (Iraq 2000-2005, 
Iraq 2005-2010) because under his rule Iraq was more authoritarian. However, after his 
rule, the Coalition Provisional Authority was established and was in order until elections 
were held. Because leadership was placed into the hands of a party until a democratically 
elected government was established, the period after Hussein’s reign is classified as 
party. 
4.1.6 Jordan  
Jordan has been coded as a monarchy because the Hashemite Dynasty has ruled 
over Jordan since 1947 and are still ruling today. The power is passed down through 
lineage so there is no need for a larger selectorate or a large winning coalition so long as 
the power remains in the Hashemite Dynasty.  Here the kings hold a wide variety of 
executive and legislative powers of government and parliament. It is important to keep in 
mind that although Jordan is a monarchy, it is to be considered as an authoritarian 
 monarchy.  
4.1.7 Kuwait  
Kuwait has been coded as a monarchy because the Al Sabah dynasty has ruled 
over Kuwait since 1962 after the independence of Kuwait was obtained. However, the 
monarchy of Kuwait has been classified as a constitutional monarchy with a parliament 
because there is an Emir as well as a prime minister who serve as heads of state. It is 
important to note that although Kuwait has a prime minister, the Emir chooses the prime 
minister and has executive power. Though it is classified as a constitutional monarchy, 
 it is not be mistaken for the constitutional monarchies that are present in England 
because these constitutional monarchies take on many autocratic qualities as well their 
heads of state hold much power and possess less constraints than other constitutional 
monarchies. Royal families like these are authoritarian and hold much power when it 
comes to their place in government, especially in countries like Kuwait who is a member 
of OPEC.  
4.1.8 Libya  
Libya is coded as monarchy from the 1952-1969 when it was ruled by the Senussi 
Dynasty. Afterwards, from 1970-2011, Libya was ruled under Muammar Gaddafi. 
Because the reign of Gaddafi was not constrained by a strong party or a unified party and 
the government was centered around Gaddafi who help power, the rule is coded as 
personal under the GWF codebook. Currently, Libya's government is classified as 
undetermined because after a reign of 42 years, Gaddafi was overthrown and country has 
since then experienced coup détats, but not a definite regime status.  
4.1.9 Morocco  
Morocco has been coded as a monarchy because the Alaouite Dynasty has ruled 
over the region since 1957. The members of the selectorate are small because so long as 
the power remains within the family, the next leader will simply inherit his power from 
his royal family. And because the power is inherited, there is no need for a large winning 
coalition. It is important to keep in mind that although Morocco is a monarchy, it is to be 
considered as an authoritarian monarchy.  
4.1.10 Oman  
Oman is coded as a monarchy because the Al Bu Said Dynasty has been in power 
since 1742.  Oman´s monarchy is not to be mistaken with other monarchies in Western 
Europe. Royal families like these are authoritarian and hold much power when it comes 
to their place in government, especially in countries like Oman who is a member of 
OPEC.  
4.1.11 Qatar  
Qatar is coded as monarchy because it has been ruled under the reign of the Al 
Thani Dynasty since 1825. Qatar´s monarchy is not to be mistaken with other monarchies 
in Western Europe. Royal families like these are authoritarian and hold much power 
when it comes to their place in government, especially in countries like Qatar who is a 
member of OPEC.  
4.1.12 Saudi Arabia  
Saudi Arabia is classified as a monarchy within the GWF codebook because the 
Saud Dynasty has ruled in the region since 1928. It is important to understand that 
although Saudi Arabia is classified as a monarchy, it is not to be considered as of the 
same monarchies that are present within other countries. These royal families are 
authoritarian and hold much power when it comes to their place in government,especially 
in countries like Saudi Arabia who is a member of OPEC.  
4.1.13 Syria  
Syria is coded as an oligarchy in 1947 because President Shukri Kuwatly was 
re-elected through election after Syria retain its independence, however not everyone was 
able to vote in these elections. Syria is then coded during 1950-1951 as an indirect 
military because the coup d'état led by Hussni al-Zaimy took over, but still allowed for 
elections to take place for leader though they placed much influence on their preferred 
candidate. In 1952-1954, the GWF codebook has Syria coded as a military because the 
coup d'état led by Hussein al-Zaimy was overthrown by a fellow officer known as Adib 
al-Shishakli and he also ruled with a coup d'etat.  In 1958, Syria united Egypt to become 
the United Arab Republic and under this rule, Gamal Abdel Nasser served as the leader. 
Because Nasser was not constrained by a political party and the leadership was solely 
placed in his hands, Syria is coded a personal regime during this time period. Syria 
experienced a coup d'etat in 1963, but because the leaders still allowed for competitive 
elections to take place, Syria is coded as an indirect military during this time period. In 
1964, Syria was no longer apart of the United Arab Republic, and was now under the 
National Revolutionary Command which was a militia group that was controlled by the 
Baáth Party.  There was one man by the name of Amin-al-Hafiz that was in control of the 
militia and the party. Because during this time, Syria had one man in control and he has 
the influence of the military and a social party, Syria is coded as party-personal-military 
in 1963.  Syria from 1966-2000 has been coded as military because since Syrian Arab 
Republic dissolved, Syria has suffered numerous coup d´etats. 
 
4.1.14 Tunisia  
The GWF codebook has categorized Tunisia as a party since 1963-2011. The 
qualities for coding a regime as a party is the regime needs the leadership, security, and 
policy duties to be placed in the hands of a ruling party. In 1963, the Constitutional 
Democratic Rally formerly known as Neo Destour legally declared itself as the ruling 
party of Tunisia and has ruled as a one-party state since then, but as of 2011 the party has 
dissolved because of the Tunisian revolution.  
4.1.15 United Arab Emirates  
 The GWF codebook codes the United Arab Emirates as a monarchy, but the UAE 
has a interesting monarchy status because it is a federation made up of by seven royal 
families (Al Nahyan Dynasty, Al Maktoum Dynasty, Al Qasimi Dynasty, Al Nuaimi 
Dynasty, Al Mualla Dynasty, and Al Sharqi Dynasty) who have been ruling collectively 
as a political body since 1972. Although the United Arab Emirates´monarchy is a 
monarchy made up of seven royal families, it is important to consider that all of these 
families 
 hold much power within the UAE government especially since the country is an 
important member of OPEC.  
4.1.16 Yemen  
The GWF codebook classifies Yemen from 1919-1962 as a monarchy because of 
the rule of the Mutawakkilite kingdom during that time period. From 1963-1967, Yemen 
suffered a coup d'etat after the dethroning of Imam Muhammad al-Badr during the North 
Yemen Civil War. Because the coup d'etat depended on the collaboration of other officers 
and was led by men who had been officers, this time period is coded as a military. During 
the years of 1968-1991, Yemen is classified as personalist and military, and the reason 
being is that the ruling power was placed in the hands of one individual who was Abu 
Abdullah Saleh and although he was not constrained by a party, he ruled with a group 
known as the Houthis which was a political armed group. Because this group was once 
soldiers and they govern in collaboration with other officers, during the years of 
1975-1979 as a military. After the South Yemen and North Yemen were unified in 1990, 
the country was classified as a republic which the GWF codebook does not have a 
specific category for it to fall under. Last, but not least, the status of Yemen's government 
has been declared undetermined after the coup d'etat that took place in 2014-2015 which 
can be classified as military within the GWF codebook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
4.2 Who Has Power? 
 
After identifying the types of authoritarian regimes, I noticed that I had quite a 
few countries that classified as monarchy, however I was unsure if the level of power 
remained the same amongst them. As a result, I performed a search to identify the level 
of power that the leader(s) of each monarchy within my sample study possessed. 
Figure 2. Monarchy Power Chart 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Monarchy Power Chart (Continued)  
4.3 Level of Authoritarianism 
4.3.1 Level of Authoritarianism Explained 
Following this, I was able to then classify countries as being of high or low 
authoritarianism. I predicted that the level of authoritarianism would consequently affect 
how strict or moderate leaders would be with their economic policies and/or how 
involved they would be in bettering their development. Countries that have been 
classified as exhibiting a high level of authoritarianism are on account of them not 
exercising quasi-democratic institutions/ quasi-democratic policies in any form. This 
indicates that they do not delegate any power to either a council, prime minister, etc., as 
well as they do not exercise policies that would make them less sovereign to their citizens 
such as holding elections. Countries that have been identified as exhibiting a low level of 
authoritarianism are due to either the fact that they do exhibit a federation of powers 
between the leader and another party or they practice policies that are quasi-democratic in 
nature. Though these countries may have a leader that exercises full control in spite of 
delegating some of his power to other institutions and though they may frame their 
quasi-democratic policies to go as they anticipate, these countries are not considered of 
high authoritarianism because they have implemented these forms within their 
authoritarian regime. Iraq, however being the exception, is classified as both because it 
contained a time period (2000-2005) where its regime experienced a high level of 
authoritarianism until a transition occurred 
 within the regime (2005-2010) that later resulted in the exercise of quasi-democratic 
policies such as elections.  
Figure 3​. Authoritarianism Chart 
 
  
 
  
 
Chapter Five: Data Procedure 
Because my research question involves comparing statistics from other countries 
within the MENA region to others, my data was gathered from sources that have already 
collected the information needed such as the World Bank as well as the United Nations 
Development Programme. Together, these sources provide me information concerning 
the four variables chosen as measurements of economic development. They are as 
followed: GDP per capita (PPP), GDP annual growth, life expectancy index, as well as 
human development index.  
GDP per capita (PPP) was selected as a variable because with each of the 
different countries, they might possess different currencies which might be worth more or 
less with time. The value of the currencies during a given time period can affect the 
economy in the long-term which can affect the wealth and potentially the economic 
development in a country. The data on this variable was generated annually.  
In addition to this variable, I thought that it would be important to also look at the 
annual growth of the GDP per capita. Many of the countries that are within my study 
export oil and they can gather wealth on account of this, however, with the price of oil,  it 
fluctuates and this can create imbalances with one´s economy and/or economic 
development.  To add, part of my study concerns observing how well these regimes can 
manage their economies during crises as well being able to generate wealth 
 with and without their main source of income. And with observing the annual growth 
GDP per capita, I am able to see how well the regimes within these countries are able to 
do this over time When assessing whether these two variables were appropriate 
measurements, I evaluated a study performed by political scientist Robert Barro where he 
utilized these variables as determinants to measure observe economic development. In his 
study, he asserts that at times growth may increase with favorable moments, 
 however the latter effect is weak. Furthermore, this would allow me to see how the 
economic growth responds with and without these favorable moments (Barro 2003). 
 While on the subject of economy, it is important to understand that without 
people, there will be no one there to make an economy work. And with wealth, one needs 
people to manage it, but there are things that might need to be set in place that ensure that 
people can be able to do the job. This might be implemented in the form of welfare 
provisions, healthcare, education, etc. As a result, I need to observe how well these 
nations decide to approach these issues and whether or not their approach is affecting 
their economies in a beneficial or harmful way. I decided that the variables of life 
expectancy index and human development index would be appropriate variables to 
measure this because it would allow one to observe how well the economy is doing when 
domestic conditions are well as well as when they are poor. The Human Development 
Index (HDI) has been considered a fair indicator of development on account of a study 
conducted by Kemal Dervis and Jeni Klugman, in that it combines the average 
 of income, health, and education of a country. The HDI has been considered a good way 
to monitor  human progress in comparison some studies that solely focus on income. 
However, it can be flawed in that it does not considered things such as distribution of 
income or inequality among the factors it observes (Dervis & Klugman 2011). Last, but 
not least, LEI was chosen as a fitting indicator for social development on account of a 
study by Gabriel Gulis who states that measuring life expectancy against different 
environmental factors allows us to see the overall impact of these variables on the health 
of the individual (Gulis 1999). 
All of the data was observed from the years of 2000-2010. This time period was 
chosen to give a significant time to observe the influence of the variables, however within 
a time period that was not too late or during a difficult time period for countries with 
unusual events such as the Arab Spring. The variables were calculated for each country. 
Each country was placed in one of the two groups, one being only members of OPEC, 
and the other of non-OPEC members.  
The variables regarding the non-OPEC members were measured first in order to 
observe how the following variables would affect autocratic countries who were not main 
exporters of oil. These values were then compiled into a spreadsheet where the total as 
well as the average of the variables were calculated for each country between the years of 
2000-2010 and then combined to calculate the total and average of all the countries 
within the group during the time period. These recorded values were then 
 tabled to not only give a physical representation of what the data would look like in 
relation to my hypotheses, but to also individually observe the subunits of my data before 
t-tests were performed to actually test the significance of my results in relation to my 
theories. 
Within my hypotheses, there are two groups (OPEC and non-OPEC), and there 
are three comparative groups: high & low authoritarianism, absolute monarchies & 
non-absolute monarchies, and RRLAs (resource-rich, labor abundant) and non-RRLAs). 
The difference of means was determined for each of comparative groups for each 
variable within both groups. Afterwards, the mean for each country within that group was 
combined into a spreadsheet and a t-test was performed. This was done for each variable.  
To add to this, additional information was gathered from a variety of sources that 
involved the regime transitions, regime background, and the regime occupied during a 
given time within these countries which was later charted. The charts also included who 
possessed power within these regimes (because explicit roles of power were not known 
prior) as well as how much power they had. This later acted as another potential 
explanation for why the data observed from the variables reflected or did not reflect 
 the level of economic/social development shown for these countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter Six: Data 
6.1.1 GDP per capita (PPP) for non-OPEC members  
  The first variable I regarded was the GDP per capita (PPP) for each country. 
With the GDP per capita (PPP) of the non-OPEC members, my data displays that only 
two countries were capable of performing at or above the average GDP per capita PPP 
calculated for the non-OPEC members and they were Oman and Bahrain, Oman being of 
high authoritarianism and Bahrain being of low authoritarianism. Only one of the 
countries, Bahrain, was known for being a main exporter of oil. Though Oman has some 
oil resources, it could not be considered an oil-rich country to where its wealth can solely 
be based its GDP per capita (PPP) of its export.  The remaining countries performed 
below the average mean of GDP per capita (PPP).  
Figure 4.​ Data for Non-OPEC Members GDP per capita (PPP) 2000-2010 
 
Unfortunately, I was not able to generate information about Syria's GDP per 
capita (PPP) from the World Bank. Perhaps the lack of information could be on account 
of an error contributed by the source or that the country's economy experienced difficulty 
on account of the regime transitions and leadership turnover which can be inferred from 
regime charts. Moreover, the absence of information from Syria has compromised my 
data, therefore my sample regarding economic development within this dataset does 
 not reflect an accurate representation of the average GDP per capita PPP for this 
particular group. 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, the data concerning this variable was not as supportive 
as anticipated.  Bahrain was the only country exercising quasi-democratic institutions that 
performed above the average mean GDP per capita (PPP) for non-OPEC members.  I 
revisited my chart that discussed the level of power within monarchies to observe 
whether if it was due to the fact that Bahrain had more quasi-democratic institutions than 
the other two countries. On the contrary, my chart displayed that Morocco had 
 more limitations set forth by its quasi-democratic institutions than Bahrain or Jordan. I 
also researched additional information to observe whether any of these countries exported 
oil and found that only Bahrain was known for exporting oil (Sullivan 2013). Jordan and 
Morocco do not export oil, however Morocco is known for having a high non-oil GDP 
within the regions (World Bank 2019). Although the data displayed did not seem 
supportive of the first hypothesis, this information only considers one of the two variables 
mentioned in Hypothesis 1. To add, there were two other variables that were being 
observed to measure the development part of Hypothesis 1. 
Concerning Hypothesis 2, my data was also not supportive of my theory.  My 
hypothesis stated that absolute monarchies in the MENA region will have lower 
economic and social development. The only country within the data set of the non-OPEC 
members that could be classified as an absolute monarchy was Oman, and with this factor 
of economic development, Oman performed well above the expected mean. As 
previously mentioned, Oman does not have many oil resources to be considered oil-rich. 
However, in comparison to some other countries within this dataset such as Jordan or 
Yemen, who have small reserves or little to no oil resources, it has significantly more 
which could have a role in its GDP (Said 2015). To reiterate, this is one of the first 
factors observed, therefore it is too early to declare the data regarding this hypothesis to 
be insignificant.  
Hypothesis 3 was not supported either. My hypothesis stated that authoritarian 
countries in the MENA region who are resource and labor abundant that are also 
quasi-democratic/have some open institutions will be the most developed. There were 
only two countries within this data set of non-OPEC members that classify as RRLA and 
they were Syria and Yemen. I didn't have data for Syria which serves as a disadvantage in 
this matter, however I did have data on Yemen. Yemen actually possessed the lowest 
 GDP per capita of all the countries within this particular data set. From the regime 
charts, I inferred that Yemen has faced some discrepancies within its regime transitions 
which could have influenced the data concerning its economy.  
 
 
  
 
 
6.1.2 GDP per capita (PPP) for OPEC members  
 
After observing the GDP per capita (PPP) with the non-OPEC members, I 
observed them with the members of OPEC. These countries were known as major 
exporters of oil. Three countries in this data set performed above the mean GDP per 
capita (PPP) that was measured to be performed by all of countries. Two of these 
countries (Kuwait and UAE) were of low authoritarianism due to the presence of 
quasi-democratic institutions, and one was of high authoritarianism (Qatar).  
 
Figure 5.​ Data for OPEC Members GDP per capita (PPP) 2000-2010 
My data collected from this data set was more supportive of Hypothesis 1 in that 
almost all the countries that were considered to be of low authoritarianism experienced 
greater economic development than those who did not, with Iraq and Qatar as outliers. 
Even Saudi Arabia was quite close to the overall average for members of OPEC.  
With Hypothesis 2, I only had two countries that could constitute as an absolute 
monarchy and that was Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The information presented on this 
variable only addressed the economic development and not the social development factor 
because the other social variables were to be measured after. However as far as economic 
development, my prediction did not prove to have any validity. Qatar in fact had the 
highest of GDP per capita (PPP) and Saudi Arabia though it did not reach the mean, 
 did not have the lowest. I gathered additional information to identify if this was on 
account of Qatar being the largest exporter of oil within OPEC, however what I found 
was that Saudi Arabia is actually the largest oil exporter in OPEC (Blas, Davis 2018).  
Hypothesis 3 anticipated that countries who were resource and labor abundant 
would be the most economically developed. Of this data set, those countries were 
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. None of these countries were capable of meeting the 
average mean expected for all the countries within this data set, let alone half of it. All 
nations except Iraq (2005-2010) were countries that were not classified of exercising 
quasi-democratic institutions which could have served as a disadvantage with their 
 economic policies. Another potential explanation could be that countries such as Libya 
and Iraq have experienced either international or domestic conflict during this time period 
which is expressed within my regime charts.  
6.2.1 GDP Annual Growth for Non-OPEC Members  
After analyzing the GDP per capita (PPP), I examined the variable of GDP 
Annual Growth. The reason being is that I wanted to observe whether the decrease or 
increase in GDP per capita (PPP) would lead to more or less growth in GDP per capita 
overall. To add, this variable is also a stronger indicator to measure economic 
development in these countries because it is able to depict how well an economy does in 
spite of its possession or non-possession of oil.  
 
Figure 6​. Data for Non-OPEC Members GDP Annual Growth 2000-2010 
 
The anticipated average GDP Annual Growth for the non-OPEC members was 
expected to be 4.78. My data reflected that only four countries (Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and 
Jordan) within this data set performed either at or above the expected mean, half being 
completely authoritarian and the other half being quasi-democratic.  Two of the four 
countries (Syria and Bahrain) were known for their exports of oil and the remaining two 
(Egypt and Jordan) had very little resources of oil yet experienced approximately the 
same and at times more GDP growth than the other two countries.  
The recorded data seemed to support Hypothesis 1 with this variable. Both of the 
countries that exercised quasi-democratic institutions within their regimes experienced 
higher economic growth than their counterparts. Bahrain was the only country that was a 
large exporter of oil out of the two. I performed additional research to assess what might 
have contributed to Jordan´s economic growth because Bahrain and Jordan´s leaders 
more or less exercised the same amount of quasi-democratic power. I observed 
 that Jordan had main exports of textiles, phosphates, etc that could contribute to its GDP 
annual growth (Trading Economics 2019). After reviewing the data from this variable 
and the previous variable, I was given the impression that this sample would be regarded 
as insignificant in that there was not consistent pattern with the authoritarian countries 
that exercised quasi-democratic institutions showing greater economic growth, however 
this only applied to the economic part of my hypothesis and not the social development 
part.  
Concerning Hypothesis 2, my theory was also supported. There was only one 
absolute monarchy within this data set (Oman), and it retained the lowest GDP annual 
growth out of all the other countries. With the results collected from this variable and the 
previous variable, my results for this hypothesis could also be regarded as insignificant 
because a clear correlation between the two variables was not established with this 
sample. Though the data from both of the economic variables served as insubstantial 
 evidence of my theory because the data reported the absolute monarchies having high 
and low levels of economic development with the variables, I still observed the social 
factors before regarding the whole theory as proven to be untrue.  
Unfortunately, Hypothesis 3 was not backed by the information recorded. Though 
Syria and Yemen did not perform the lowest, they either performed at or below the mean 
for GDP annual growth. The data collected from this measurement along with the 
previous variable began to reflect an early projection that the entire hypothesis was 
proving to be invalid. The reason being is that hypothesis states that countries that are 
RRLAs will be the most developed but both variables observed reflect that they are 
 not economically developed and in order to be the most developed, they would have to 
be the most developed economically as well as socially. Contrary to this, I still observed 
the other variables of social development to see if these countries performed better with 
social/human development rather than economic. 
6.2.2 GDP Annual Growth for OPEC members 
I then moved on to the GDP Annual Growth for the members of OPEC. 
Unfortunately during the years of 2000-2010, there were only two OPEC members that 
performed at or above the expected mean of annual growth for this data set and those 
countries were Qatar and Iraq (2005-2010). Because Qatar is a member of OPEC, it can 
be inferred that much of its wealth has been on account of its production of oil, however I 
did some additional research to reveal how important its reserves are. I discovered that 
Qatar has one of the largest oil reserves in the world, therefore it has much of its wealth 
on account of its export (Dillinger 2015). As for Iraq, it’s wealth can not only be 
attributed to the fact that it possess the fifth largest oil reserves in the world, but also 
because it also endured a regime transition during this time period which could have 
stimulated its economy by liberating it. 
Figure 7​. Data for OPEC Members GDP Annual Growth 2000-2010 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, the data accommodated my anticipations regarding 
authoritarian regimes that possessed quasi-democratic institutions. Although only one of 
the quasi-democratic authoritarian regimes experienced growth at or above the expected 
average, all of them experienced more annual growth than those that exercised a high 
level of authoritarianism with the exception of Qatar. Considering the results reported for 
the variable of GDP per capita (PPP) as well as those represented with this 
 variable, I inferred that to some extent authoritarian regimes that exercise 
quasi-democratic institutions will experience higher economic development than those 
that do not. But before anticipating that the testing on this hypothesis would render true, I 
also observed the social development variables as well.  
On account of Qatar experiencing the highest annual growth and Saudi Arabia 
exhibiting the lowest, the data was not in favor of Hypothesis 2. Not only did Qatar 
performed at or above the average, but it also surpassed the mean by twice as much as I 
measured it to be. Again, as previously mentioned, Qatar does have one of the largest oil 
reserves in world, however Saudi Arabia has the largest within the data set and its annual 
growth was not even close to that of Qatar’s (Dillinger 2019). It can also be inferred that 
there are other factors besides its main export of oil contributing to its annual growth. 
With the results reported from GDP Annual Growth variable and as well the GDP per 
capita (PPP) variable, I predicted that the t-test regarding absolute monarchies 
experiencing lower economic development would not prove to be valid with the data 
observed. 
Finally, the results involving this variable were not backed by Hypothesis 3. In 
fact, only one of these countries (Iraq 2005-2010) met and performed above the 
anticipated mean. After observing the GDP per capita and the annual growth of these 
countries, I predicted that the data regarding this hypothesis would not be valid. My 
hypothesis stated that these countries would be the most developed and based off my 
variables that would mean economically and socially. However, though the data proves 
that these countries are not the most developed economically, it does not indicate that 
they will not be the most developed socially. It simply conveys that this hypothesis 
cannot be proven true overall, therefore I continued my observance of this data set with 
the social development variables.  
6.3.1 Life Expectancy Index (LEI) for Non-OPEC Members 
After observing the economic development variables, I observed the social 
development variables. I first began with observing the Life Expectancy Index (LEI), and 
my reason for observing this variable first is that I wanted to observe how the economic 
policies would affect a country’s population with a direct relationship before viewing it 
from a holistic view.  
Figure 8.​ Data for Non-OPEC Members LEI 2000-2010 
My results from this subset did not appear to be significant concerning this 
variable and Hypothesis 1. Although all autocratic countries that exercised 
quasi-democratic institutions within this dataset performed at or above the average LEI, 
almost all of those countries who exercised a high level of authoritarianism did as well. 
As far as the second prediction of Hypothesis 1,determining whether or not those that 
exercise quasi-democratic institutions have more social development than those that 
 do not, my data does not provide any indication that this is true. 
The data did not seem to defend the assumptions of Hypothesis 2. Oman did not 
experience a lower level of social development that I anticipated. In fact, Oman 
experienced one of the highest LEI observed within the data set. It is to be considered 
that Oman is highly authoritarian, but also to some extent Oman was still able to maintain 
a high LEI regardless of its stance on quasi-democratic institutions. Though I still had 
one more variable to observe before concluding my suspicions that the hypothesis 
 would not matter with this subset, the data previously observed leaned more towards it 
not being applicable.  
The data surrounding my Hypothesis 3 was not very indicative of my theorems. 
With the previously variables, I observed that they were not the most economically 
developed, however with this data I noticed that the RRLAs were just as socially 
developed as the countries that are non-RRLAs. Oman and Tunisia experienced the same 
LEI as Syria and Yemen who were RRLAs and Bahrain even surpassed the LEI of these 
two countries.  
 
6.3.2 Life Expectancy Index (LEI) for OPEC Members 
More than half the samples within this data set performed at or above the LEI, and 
those that did not were relatively close to meeting the average LEI expected for this data 
set.  
 
Figure 9.​ Data for OPEC Members LEI 2000-2010 
Hypothesis 1 could be considered plausible based on the data provided from this 
sample. Almost all of the countries that exercised quasi-democratic institutions 
performed above the expected average LEI except for Iraq (2005-2010). After observing 
the economic development variables in addition to this social development variable, I can 
infer that countries exercising quasi-democratic can experience more social and economic 
development.  
Qatar and Saudi Arabia performed above the mean, with Qatar obtaining the 
highest of the data set. Albeit that I still had to observe the HDI variable to suspect that 
the evidence would not substantially support my hypothesis, the data gathered so far from 
the three variables has been in favor of the theory not being viable.  
 Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Out of all the RRLAs, only one performed at or 
above the average LEI for this set and that country was Algeria. Most of the RRLAS 
actually retained some of the lowest LEI of all the units within the group. Previously I 
deduced that the RRLAs would probably not be the most developed economically, and it 
is proving to be the least socially developed. However I still had one more variable to 
observe before assuming my hypothesis would be rejected completely with the 
 t-testing. 
6.4.1 Human Development Index (HDI) for Non-OPEC Members 
Finally, my last variable of the Human Development Index (HDI) was observed. 
This variable was comprised of numerous indicators of human development such as the 
life expectancy index, education index, and gross national income per capita to provide a 
more holistic view of how the type of regime a country possesses can affect its economic 
policies as well as how those policies can affect the social and economic development of 
a country. 
Figure 10​. Data for Non-OPEC Member HDI 2000-2010 
Hypothesis 1 was not strongly supported by the data. Those that exercised 
quasi-democratic institutions as well as those who did not exercise quasi-democratic 
institutions had the same amount of countries to obtain an HDI index at or above the 
expected HDI for this dataset. After gathering all the information from the variables, I 
presumed that the data of all the variables observed and the countries that exercised 
quasi-democratic institutions would not be of importance. There was not a consistent 
 pattern within the data set to infer that there was any correlation between authoritarian 
regimes that exercised quasi-democratic institutions producing high levels of economic 
growth and social development.  
Following Hypothesis 2, my results did not support my theory. Oman, the 
absolute monarchy of this data set, retained the highest of HDI of all the subset units 
within this sample. Through all the variables measured, Oman has more or less shown a 
consistent pattern of obtaining high economic growth and social development aside from 
the results recorded with the variable of GDP Annual Growth. I gathered that my theory 
regarding absolute monarchies experiencing lower economic and social development 
 within this data set would not justifiable by my data.  
To conclude this variable, my data did not support Hypothesis 3. The two RRLAs 
within my data set, Syria and Yemen,  obtained the two of the lowest HDI presented 
within the data. With all of the variables accounted for, my theory seemed to not be 
backed by the data I gathered. 
 
 
6.4.2 Human Development Index (HDI) for OPEC Members 
Lastly, I observed my last variable of the OPEC member data set. My data 
reflected that half of the members within the data set performed at or above the expected 
average HDI, most of these members were those that exercised a lower level of 
authoritarianism. 
Figure 11​.Data for OPEC Members HDI 2000-2010 
Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data provided. Almost all of the low 
authoritarian regimes within this data set experienced high levels of HDI aside from Iraq 
(2005-2010). Again,  Iraq did undergo a regime transition in this duration which might 
have affected its economic and social development as a whole (Crichton, et al. 2010). 
Overall, my data could be considered insubstantial in comparison to the data recorded 
from the other the variables because there was not a consistent pattern established 
 that could prove this to be true.  
My second hypothesis is anticipated to be  proven false. Qatar performed at or 
above the expected average for all the variables and Saudi Arabia, though in many 
categories performed low, did not consistently perform as the lowest. As a result, it 
showed signed that the hypothesis was not be validated with either of the data sets.  
To conclude, Hypothesis 3 was not supported by this data. There was only one 
RRLA that performed at or above the anticipated mean for this variable and that was 
Libya. After observing all the data, I judged that the hypothesis for these data sets would 
be irrelevant. There was not a consistent correlation between the RRLAs being the most 
socially or economically developed so this hypothesis seems not applicable for these 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven: T-Tests 
 
T-Test Analysis 
After viewing a breakdown of the data, I was not only able to make inferences 
based on each country’s individual performance, but also I was able to see how they 
would be accounted for in the hypothesis testing. First, the difference of means was 
calculated for the three comparative groups (high & low authoritarianism, absolute 
monarchies and non-absolute monarchies, and RRLAs and non-RRLAs)  among OPEC 
and non-OPEC members. Afterwards, the p-value was then calculated for each 
comparative group in 
 relation to each variable. This was also done for both non-OPEC members and OPEC 
members. The  recorded p-value identified how significant the difference of means was in 
relation to the null hypothesis. If the p-value was greater than that of .05, then the 
evidence was not significant enough to reject my hypothesis. However, if the p-value was 
less than 0.5, the evidence was significant enough to reject the null and accept the 
alternative hypothesis. Any value that was less than .10, but greater 
 than .05 was considered almost significant, but not enough to reject the null hypothesis. 
To add, instead of including the actual numerical values,  I represented the value as    *p 
< 0.01,  p > .05, and so on, with the number of asterisks in front of the ¨p” represents the 
increasing significance of the data. 
 
 
 
 
GDP per capita for non-OPEC members  
With the GDP per capita of the non-OPEC members, the first comparative group 
of high and low authoritarianism had a p-value that was less than .05 which proved to be 
significant enough to reject Hypothesis 1. This rejection resulted in accepting the 
alternative hypothesis that considers countries that are more authoritarian will experience 
more growth and development. The remaining comparative groups were quite significant 
in that they both contain values that were less than 0.01, therefore my hypothesis 
 was proven false, making the alternative hypothesis  of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 to 
be true.  Concerning the OPEC members of this variable, all of them experienced a 
p-value that was of ***p < 0.01 which provided enough evidence for all of my 
hypotheses concerning this variable to be proven untrue. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: ​T-Tests Results 
  
GDP Annual Growth 
The comparative group of high and low authoritarianism with non-OPEC 
members contained the only p-value that was significant enough for me to reject a null 
hypothesis. The other comparative groups contained values that were greater than 0.05, 
therefore Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 still stand with this variable. With the annual 
growth of OPEC members, the comparative groups all experienced a p-value that was 
greater than .05 which resulted in all three hypotheses to still hold validity because there 
 was insufficient evidence to disprove them. 
Life Expectancy Index 
All theories were rejected with this variable amongst the non-OPEC members. 
Each pair of the three comparative groups expressed the same p-value of p < .01 which is 
quite significant to reject the null hypotheses. As a result, my alternative hypotheses for 
all three must be accepted. As far as the OPEC members performance with this variable, 
only the comparative group of high and low authoritarianism was not significant enough 
to invalidate. Aside from this comparative group, the remaining two experienced 
 a p-value that was more than enough to reject Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. 
Human Development Index 
Last, but not least, I found that Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 were rejected with the 
non-OPEC members involving this variable because they all expressed a p-value of **p < 
0.01 which is more than significant to disprove my three theories. As for the OPEC 
members regarding this variable, all of the p-values resulted in the rejection of 
Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 with the latter two comparative groups containing more evidence 
to reject their hypothesis than the first comparative group. 
Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
In conclusion, the assumptions that I had made observing each country’s 
individual performance did not support the results expressed in the testing of my 
hypotheses. In fact, almost all of my hypotheses were rejected with the four variables, 
aside from the variable of GDP Annual Growth where there was not enough evidence to 
disprove Hypothesis 2 and 3. But how can this be? 
In the beginning, I made the assertion that not much is known about these regimes 
and that their nature differs from others within these regions. This means that with each 
nation circumstances are different, resources vary, and results produce different effects. 
While some countries such as Qatar and Oman continued to thrive without exhibiting 
much change to the power of their regime, others countries such as Iraq made changes to 
their regime. But because the nations in themselves have also endured 
 hardship or have just simply made bad investments, they do not experience the same 
success.  
This leads me to a few considerations to note when observing the progression of 
these countries in the future. First, the presence or absence of certain institutions in itself 
is not enough to control the overall level of social and economic development. I had some 
countries within my datasets that were highly authoritarian such Qatar and Oman who 
exhibited high performances, and some countries that were of low authoritarianism such 
as Bahrain and Kuwait that did just as well regardless of the difference. 
Secondly, just because a country has the resources and the labor to fuel its 
economy does not indicate that it necessary has the tools for success. For example, quite 
a few countries were considered to be RRLAs, but that did not necessarily indicate that 
they knew how to manage their resources. To add, many of these countries endured 
domestic or international conflict during this time, so even if they knew how to manage 
these things, circumstances could be prove different when undergoing a crisis. And last, 
but not least on this matter, possessing these tools does not necessarily place a country in 
good standing to compete economically/socially with countries that experience great 
wealth from exports/resources such as oil which they may not have.  
My third and final note is that each country should be treated with a case-by-case 
approach. Many countries within my study responded differently with the presence or 
absence of conflict, resources, transitions etc., which was later expressed within their 
economic/social development.  And because they counter each matter differently, an 
approach that anticipates to be the remedy for all countries in these regions for example 
democracy or my approach of an equipped quasi-democracy would not likely 
 be the answer for at least some of them.  
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